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INTRODUCTION
Whether cast as insidious or cast aside as fictitious, the American “deep
state” is an increasingly compelling concept in the Age of Trump.  In a year’s
time, a label that had practically no domestic resonance has been elevated to
the status of public enemy number one.  Indeed, when things have gone
badly for the Trump administration—as they often have—the President, his
allies, and White House surrogates have been quick to blame the deep state.
Such a deep state, characterized by Team Trump as disloyal and undemo-
© 2018 Jon D. Michaels.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce and
distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational purposes, so
long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the Notre Dame Law Review,
and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, UCLA School of Law.  For helpful comments and conversations,
thanks are owed to Frederic Bloom, Kristen Eichensehr, David Fontana, Aziz Huq, Toni
Michaels, Richard Re, David Super, and Christopher Walker.  Thanks are owed too to
UCLA Law Librarian Jodi Kruger; my research assistant, Brandon Amash; friends and
colleagues participating in the Notre Dame Law Review Symposium on Administrative
Lawmaking in the Twenty-First Century; Jeffrey Pojanowski, gracious host and architect of this
Symposium; and Shelby Compton, Brent Murphy, and their colleagues on the Notre Dame
Law Review.
This Article builds on a short contribution penned for Foreign Affairs. See Jon D.
Michaels, Trump and the “Deep State,” FOREIGN AFF. (Sept./Oct. 2017), https://www.foreign
affairs.com/articles/2017-08-15/trump-and-deep-state.
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cratic forces within and around government,1 has served as an all-purpose
scapegoat, diverting attention from the mounting evidence of White House
corruption and incompetence, demonizing and delegitimizing critics of the
administration, and jeopardizing the long-term health and vitality of the fed-
eral bureaucracy and myriad pillars of civil society.
New to the United States,2 the concept of a deep state has considerable
transnational purchase.  Usually any mention of a deep state conjures up
images of shadowy and powerful antidemocratic cabals that threaten popular
rule.  For good reason, one may look at some precariously (or simply nomi-
nally) democratic countries’ militaries, key ministries, and state-owned indus-
tries with trepidation.  Close observers of places like Egypt, Turkey, Pakistan,
and Iran have witnessed enough crackdowns on free speech and assembly,
electoral subversions, and rollbacks of good governance reforms to know
how that movie ends.3
1 See, e.g., Daniel Benjamin & Steven Simon, Why Steve Bannon Wants You to Believe in
the Deep State, POLITICO (Mar. 21, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/
03/steve-bannon-deep-state-214935; Daniel Chaitin, Trump Promotes “Deep State”-Focused Epi-
sode of “Hannity,” WASH. EXAMINER (June 16, 2017), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com
/trump-promotes-deep-state-focused-episode-of-hannity/article/2626272; Alexandra Glori-
oso, Rooney Calls for “Purge” of “Deep State” Workers at DOJ, FBI, POLITICO (Dec. 26, 2017),
https://www.politico.com/states/florida/story/2017/12/26/rooney-calls-for-purge-of-
deep-state-workers-at-doj-fbi-161479; Jeremy W. Peters, The Right Builds an Alternative Narra-
tive About the Crises Around Trump, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/
2017/05/17/us/politics/trump-scandal-conservatives-media.html; Tom Porter, Deep State:
How a Conspiracy Theory Went from Political Fringe to Mainstream, NEWSWEEK (Aug. 2, 2017),
http://www.newsweek.com/deep-state-conspiracy-theory-trump-645376; Brooke Seipel,
Donald Trump Jr. Shares Tweet He Says Is “Confirmation Deep State Is Real,” HILL (July 7, 2017),
http://thehill.com/homenews/news/341074-donald-trump-jr-shares-tweet-he-says-is-con-
firmation-deep-state-is-real; Z. Byron Wolf, Trump Embraces Deep State Conspiracy Theory, CNN
(Nov. 29, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/11/29/politics/donald-trump-deep-state/
index.html.
2 Prior to 2017, references to an American deep state were few and far between,
surely because the term was closely associated with institutions and regimes so utterly
unlike those in the United States. See David Remnick, There Is No Deep State, NEW YORKER
(Mar. 20, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/03/20/there-is-no-deep-
state. But see MIKE LOFGREN, THE DEEP STATE: THE FALL OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
RISE OF A SHADOW GOVERNMENT (2014).
3 See, e.g., Ryan Gingeras, In the Hunt for the “Sultans of Smack:” Dope, Gangsters and the
Construction of the Turkish Deep State, 65 MIDDLE EAST J. 426 (2011); Anil Kalhan, “Gray Zone”
Constitutionalism and the Dilemma of Judicial Independence in Pakistan, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 1 (2013); Mehtap So¨yler, Informal Institutions, Forms of State and Democracy: The Turkish
Deep State, 20 DEMOCRATIZATION 310 (2013); Charles Levinson & Matt Bradley, In Egypt, the
“Deep State” Rises Again, WALL ST. J. (July 19, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB10001424127887324425204578601700051224658; Bessma Momani, In Egypt, “Deep State”
vs. “Brotherhoodization,” BROOKINGS (Aug. 21, 2013), http://www.brookings.edu/research/
opinions/2013/08/21-egypt-brotherhood-momani; Sanam Vakil & Hossein Rassam, Iran’s
Next Supreme Leader, FOREIGN AFF. (May/June 2017), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/arti-
cles/iran/2017-04-09/iran-s-next-supreme-leader; Alex Vatanka, Rouhani Goes to War
Against Iran’s Deep State, FOREIGN POL’Y (May 18, 2017), http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/
05/18/rouhani-goes-to-war-against-irans-deep-state/.
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This Article, written for the Notre Dame Law Review Symposium on Admin-
istrative Lawmaking in the Twenty-First Century, considers the notion of bureau-
cratic depth and what it means in the American context.  In what follows, I
argue that the American deep state has very little in common with those
regimes usually understood to harbor deep states; that, far from being shad-
owy or elitist, the American bureaucracy is very much a demotic institution,
demographically diverse, highly accountable, and lacking financial incentives
or caste proclivities to subvert popular will; that demotic bureaucratic depth
of the American variety should be celebrated, not feared; and that, going
forward, we need greater, not lesser, depth insofar as the American bureau-
cracy serves an important, salutary, and quite possibly necessary role in safe-
guarding our constitutional commitments and enriching our public policies.
I. WASHING ONTO AMERICA’S SHORES
In response to the recent barrage of claims of a nefarious American
deep state, most mainstream media outlets have treated such assertions—and
the corresponding transnational comparisons—with the usual mixture of
bemusement and outrage that marks professional reporting of the Trump
presidency.  To be sure, some commentators have gone further, strenuously
shooting down cross-national comparisons to moneyed and mighty cliques as
misleading and dangerously inflammatory.4  Others, however, have gotten
caught up in the frenzy, seemingly conflating bureaucratic depth with
plutocratic government and any number of other grievances and fears, real
or imagined.5
Given the mood of the nation, there is good reason to reject the very
premise of an American deep state.  This is especially true so long as the
concept serves primarily as fodder for conspiracy mongering and as fuel for
the domestic culture wars.6  Yet such wholesale rejections come at the
expense of accuracy, nuance, and opportunity.  In truth, we do have—and
have long enjoyed—bureaucratic depth.  And Donald Trump, more than any
other President, has brought into relief its legal and political raisons d’eˆtre.
Broadly speaking, prior to 2017 our deep state has simply been referred
to as our state.  At its center—and at the center of the instant political mael-
strom—is the vast expanse of federal administrative agencies.  These entities
are responsible for making and enforcing regulations, designing and run-
ning welfare programs, combating crime and corruption, and providing for
4 See David A. Graham, There Is No American “Deep State,” ATLANTIC (Feb. 20, 2017),
https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/02/why-its-dangerous-to-talk-
about-a-deep-state/517221/; Rebecca Ingber, The “Deep State” Myth and the Real Executive
Branch Bureaucracy, LAWFARE (June 14, 2017), https://lawfareblog.com/deep-state-myth-
and-real-executive-branch-bureaucracy; Remnick, supra note 2.
5 See What Is the Deep State?, To the Point, KCRW (Dec. 21, 2017), http://
www.kcrw.com/news-culture/shows/to-the-point/what-is-the-deep-state (podcast commen-
tary by Mike Lofgren).
6 Jon D. Michaels, The War on Federal Employees, AM. PROSPECT (Dec. 11, 2017), http://
prospect.org/article/war-on-federal-employees.
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the national defense.7  Our deep state also includes the personnel entrusted
with the day-to-day operations of those agencies.8  Principal among them are
federal employees9—though we ought not forget the legions of private gov-
ernment contractors,10 state and local officials,11 and members of civil soci-
ety who play any number of key, supporting, and contrarian roles when it
comes to matters of administrative design, implementation, and oversight.12
Drawing on their own sources of legal authority, professional credibility,
and, occasionally, populist bona fides, and regularly functioning at some dis-
tance from the elected leaders in the White House and Congress, federal
bureaucrats are a force to be reckoned with.13  This is particularly true in a
modern, complex political economy such as ours, which is seemingly far
more dependent on the hundreds of thousands of expert administrators and
field agents than on a few hundred lay legislators and a single chief
executive.
Much has been made of contemporary bureaucratic resistance, which
some frame as subversive.  Yet federal bureaucrats generally can be counted
on to support and advance the President’s programmatic goals.  They do so
out of deference, not docility, with the practical effect that Presidents enjoy
considerable but not unbounded leeway.  In those rare instances when Presi-
dents (and their hand-chosen agency heads) go beyond the proverbial pale,
those in the civil service are particularly well positioned to challenge, and
even resist, directives lacking a scientific, legal, or commonsense
foundation.14
7 Jon Michaels, How Trump Is Dismantling a Pillar of the American State, GUARDIAN (Nov.
7, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/nov/07/donald-trump-dis
mantling-american-administrative-state.
8 See id.
9 See, e.g., DAVID E. LEWIS & JENNIFER L. SELIN, ADMIN. CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
SOURCEBOOK OF UNITED STATES EXECUTIVE AGENCIES 66–68 (2012), https://www.acus.gov/
sites/default/files/documents/Sourcebook-2012-Final_12-Dec_Online.pdf.
10 See, e.g., PAUL C. LIGHT, THE VOLCKER ALL., THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 3–4
(2017), https://www.volckeralliance.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Issue%20Paper_
True%20Size%20of%20Government.pdf; PAUL R. VERKUIL, OUTSOURCING SOVEREIGNTY
(2007); Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Pretensions, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 717, 717 (2010).
11 See, e.g., Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for Cooperative Federalism,
79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 663 (2001).
12 See Mariano-Florentino Cue´llar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN. L. REV.
411, 414, 443 (2005); see also Aziz Z. Huq & Jon D. Michaels, The Cycles of Separation-of-Powers
Jurisprudence, 126 YALE L.J. 346, 352 (2016) (examining the “thick political surround” that
influences Congress, the President, and federal agencies); Jon D. Michaels, Deputizing
Homeland Security, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1435, 1438 (2010) (describing the deputization of pri-
vate individuals and groups to serve as, among other things, force multipliers for the fed-
eral government).
13 See, e.g., JON D. MICHAELS, CONSTITUTIONAL COUP: PRIVATIZATION’S THREAT TO THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 7–9 (2017); PAUL R. VERKUIL, VALUING BUREAUCRACY 97–100 (2017).
14 See Jon D. Michaels, An Enduring, Evolving Separation of Powers, 115 COLUM. L. REV.
515, 534 (2015).
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For instance, the career workforce in regulatory agencies can con-
tinue—defiantly, but lawfully—to enforce civil rights laws and health and
safety regulations, leak information, drag their feet on the implementation of
new but tendentious or insupportable orders, and produce reports useful to
any number of audiences, including Congress, judges, the media, and civil
society.15  Likewise, career diplomats and military and intelligence officials
can point to longstanding treaties, bilateral agreements, international law,
the laws of war, foreign aid appropriations, and extant, long-term projects to
justify ongoing cooperation and to provide assurances of continuing support
and engagement even during times of jarring political transition and
programmatic upheaval at home.16  Lastly, any number of agency officials
may use the authorities granted to them as whistleblowers, inspectors gen-
eral, and the like to investigate, document, and publicize instances of high-
level government malfeasance, suggestive of either venality or run-of-the-mill
incompetence.
To be clear, these bureaucratic officials are emboldened to speak truth
to power because most of them are civil servants, insulated by law and custom
from politics and owed what in effect amounts to job tenure.17  They are
further emboldened to speak truth to power because that is what’s expected
of them, both as professionals—lawyers, economists, scientists, and the like—
and as loyal and faithful stewards of the laws, regulations, and conventions of
the United States.18
II. THE DEMOTIC DEEP STATE
Conceding the existence of an American deep state does not commit us
to accepting its toxic transnational connotations.  That is surely the intention
of the current President, his surrogates, and some especially strident critics of
the American administrative state.19  But just as national governments come
in many stripes of varying degrees of legal and political legitimacy at home
and abroad, so too do their respective bureaucracies and ministries.  As such,
15 See, e.g., Michael Crowley, America’s Deep State Is Real, POLITICO (Sept. 9, 2017),
http://www.politico.eu/article/us-donald-trump-james-comey-edward-snowden-the-deep-
state-is-real/ (describing EPA reports leaked to the New York Times and reporting on the
right-wing media’s characterization of that leak in terms of a deep state conspiracy); Jen-
nifer Nou, Bureaucratic Resistance from Below, YALE J. ON REG. NOTICE & COMMENT (Nov. 16,
2016), http://yalejreg.com/nc/bureaucratic-resistance-from-below-by-jennifer-nou/.
16 See, e.g., Idrees Ali, Pentagon’s Mattis Again Seeks to Reassure U.S. Allies, REUTERS (Aug.
19, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-mattis-trump/pentagons-mattis-again-
seeks-to-reassure-u-s-allies-idUSKCN1AZ0D0; Ellen Mitchell, Military Pushes Back on Trump’s
Transgender Ban, HILL (Aug. 13, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/defense/346261-mili-
tary-pushes-back-on-trumps-transgender-ban; U.S. Nuclear General Says Would Resist “Illegal”
Trump Strike Order, REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-
nuclear-commander/u-s-nuclear-general-says-would-resist-illegal-trump-strike-order-idUS
KBN1DI0QV.
17 See Michaels, supra note 14, at 582–83.
18 See, e.g., VERKUIL, supra note 13.
19 See Benjamin & Simon, supra note 1.
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comparing the American bureaucracy to that of Egypt or Turkey or Pakistan
may be just as unilluminating as comparing the respective constitutional sys-
tems: in both contexts, the cross-national gap couldn’t be wider.
Specifically, unlike the deep states of popular lore, the American version
is:
A. Not Elitist
U.S. domestic and national security bureaucracies are hardly bastions of
privilege.  American bureaucrats are, after all, drawn from a far greater set of
schools and family backgrounds than is generally the case in Western
Europe, where Oxbridge and E´cole Nationale d’Administration graduates
have historically predominated20—let alone in Asia or the Middle East, with
its clannish, cliquish ministries and state-owned enterprises, control of which
may be a family affair and a remunerative one at that.21  Instead, American
bureaucrats, even those serving in such prestigious redoubts as the State
Department, are decidedly middle or upper-middle class, lacking the cultural
or caste proclivities or financial incentives to deviate particularly far from
median voter sentiments or statutory obligations.22
One can push this claim further: the American bureaucracy is arguably
even more demotic—and more in tune with median voters—than are our
elected legislatures, which are increasingly populated by economic, educa-
tional, and dynastic elites.  There were, in recent years, approximately 228
millionaires in the House—that’s more than half of all representatives to the
People’s chamber; and there were seventy-two millionaires in the Senate.23
Around this time, no fewer than twenty senators were graduates of Harvard
or Yale.24
By contrast, federal civil servants earn on average around $80,000 a year,
and only about half are graduates of any four-year college.25  What’s more,
federal bureaucrats tend to serve their entire careers in government, mean-
ing they have not had the opportunity, occasion, or intent to amass wealth in
the private sector, an increasing necessity for those who want to run for Con-
gress. For these reasons, and no doubt counterintuitively, ordinary Ameri-
cans may have far more in common with federal civil servants than they do
with members of Congress, cabinet secretaries, and certainly the President.
20 See JOEL D. ABERBACH ET AL., BUREAUCRATS AND POLITICIANS IN WESTERN DEMOCRA-
CIES 62, 73 (1981); Liesbet Hooghe, Images of Europe: How Commission Officials Conceive Their
Institution’s Role, 50 J. COMMON MKT. STUD. 87, 88 (2011).
21 See, e.g., MELANI CAMMETT ET AL., A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE MIDDLE EAST 81 (4th
ed. 2015).
22 See ABERBACH ET AL., supra note 20.
23 See Personal Finances, CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POL., http://www.opensecrets.org/person
al-finances/top-net-worth?type=W&year=2014&filter=A (last visited Jan. 28, 2018).
24 See Congressional Yellow Book, Winter 2018 (115th Cong., 2d Sess.).
25 U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., COMMON CHARACTERISTICS OF THE GOVERNMENT FISCAL
YEAR 2016, at 17–19 (2017) [hereinafter COMMON CHARACTERISTICS].
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B. Not Shadowy
American agencies by law and custom are overwhelmingly transparent
and accessible,26 far more than are many Middle Eastern, Asian, and Euro-
pean ministries and, again, often more so than Congress and the White
House, too.27  Indeed, unlike most conventionally invoked deep states that
function best in the shadows, ours is phototrophic, gaining strength and legiti-
macy by operating in the sunlight and with full and extensive participation
from the public at large.
American deep state photophilia is perhaps best evidenced by the fact
that purportedly “rogue” bureaucratic muscle-flexing today regularly takes
the forms described above—that is, tweets,28 leaks,29 investigations,30 and
widely distributed (and carefully annotated) reports31 supporting or discred-
26 See, e.g., Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551, 553–559, 701–706 (2012);
Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012); Government in the Sunshine Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552b (2012).
27 For holdings affirming the unreviewable nature of presidential actions, see, for
example, Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 475 (1994); Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S.
788, 801 (1992).  And, for Congress’s part, the House and Senate have been known to
conceal the terms of significant bills until mere hours before scheduled votes. See Benjy
Sarlin & Leigh Ann Caldwell, The Senate’s Health Care Bill Remains Shrouded in Secrecy, NBC
NEWS (June 15, 2017), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/senate-s-health-care-
bill-remains-shrouded-secrecy-n772456; Z. Byron Wolf, The Senate Voted on a Tax Bill Pretty
Much Nobody Had Read, CNN (Dec. 2, 2017), http://www.cnn.com/2017/12/01/politics/
senate-vote-still-writing-tax-bill/index.html.  For a comparison of national governments
along dimensions such as transparency and accessibility, see Worldwide Governance Indica-
tors, WORLD BANK, http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports (last
visited Jan. 28, 2018) (select “Voice and Accountability,” “Government Effectiveness,” “Reg-
ulatory Quality” Indicators; then select “East Asia & Pacific,” “Europe & Central Asia,”
“Middle East & North Africa,” “United States”).
28 See, e.g., Kayla Epstein & Darryl Fears, Rogue Twitter Accounts Spring up to Fight Donald
Trump on Climate Change, WASH. POST (Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/energy-environment/wp/2017/01/25/rogue-pro-science-protest-sites-are-sticking-
up-for-federal-research/.
29 See, e.g., Brian Beutler, Keep the Trump Leaks Coming, NEW REPUBLIC (Aug. 4, 2017),
https://newrepublic.com/article/144197/keep-trump-leaks-coming; Ben Wizner, How
More Trump Leaks Can Save America, TIME (May 16, 2017), http://time.com/4780889/
trump-leaks-save-america/.
30 See, e.g., Aaron C. Davis, HHS Inspector General Is Investigating Price’s Travel on Private
Charter Planes, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/investiga-
tions/investigation-launched-into-hhs-secretary-tom-prices-travel-on-charter-jets/2017/09/
22/f7659a0c-9f9b-11e7-8ea1-ed975285475e_story.html?utm_term=.7850d0d34130; Katie
Bo Williams, FBI Investigating Possible Coordination Between Russia, Trump, HILL (Mar. 20,
2017), http://thehill.com/policy/national-security/324754-comey-fbi-investigating-possi
ble-collusion-between-trump-team-moscow.
31 See, e.g., Brady Dennis et al., Trump Administration Releases Report Finding “No Convinc-
ing Alternative Explanation” for Climate Change, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2017), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/11/03/trump-administra-
tion-releases-report-finds-no-convincing-alternative-explanation-for-climate-change/?tid=SS
_tw&utm_term=.310a7a861bbf.
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iting a particular economic, scientific, or legal claim.  Even in the oft-secre-
tive world of diplomacy, we see career foreign service personnel availing
themselves of the State Department’s “dissent channel,” publishing objec-
tions to the President and Secretary’s policies for all the world to see.  Recent
dissents have been written in opposition to positions taken by both John
Kerry32 and Rex Tillerson.33  Occasionally, career officials may go so far as to
sue the President or agency heads, as career immigration officials did during
the Obama presidency when they challenged the then-President’s “deferred
action” programs as inconsistent with statutory law;34 and as an active duty
Army captain did when he challenged President Obama’s allegedly unautho-
rized military campaign against the Islamic State.35
In short, in those rare instances when the American bureaucracy takes
sides against the elected leadership, it tends to show its work, laying bare the
justifications for any apparent affront to the White House.  What’s more,
bureaucrats tend to bring others—judges, members of Congress, and the
public at large—into the policymaking and policy-scrutinizing fold.  Obvi-
ously, such transparency and inclusiveness is all the easier when deep state
participants enjoy job tenure and are acting in a clearly non-self-serving
fashion.
C. Not Monolithic
Not only is the American deep state accessible and knowable, it is also
internally diverse and fragmented.  Consider first the geographic sprawl
within and among the federal agencies, with offices and bureaus dotting the
vast American landscape.  A sizable majority—close to 85% of civilian, non-
postal federal employees—work well outside the Beltway, and about half of
all civilian, nonpostal federal employees work (and live) in so-called “red
states,” that is, politically conservative states that in 2016 voted for President
Trump.36  This sprawl suggests that federal bureaucrats are not, as commonly
thought, fully enveloped in the DC bubble; if anything, they may feel the
centrifugal forces of their sometimes far-flung communities more strongly
than the centripetal pull of headquarters.  After all, these employees live,
32 See Karen DeYoung, In Memo, U.S. Diplomats Urge More Aggressive Stance on Syria,
WASH. POST (June 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/
in-memo-us-diplomats-urge-more-aggressive-stance-on-syria/2016/06/16/ff30596a-3431-
11e6-8758-d58e76e11b12_story.html?nid&utm_term=.453297e849a0.
33 See Emily Baumgaertner, Tillerson Accused of Violating Federal Law on Child Soldiers,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/21/us/politics/tillerson-
child-soldiers.html; Jeffrey Gettleman, State Dept. Dissent Cable on Trump’s Ban Draws 1,000
Signatures, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 31, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/31/world/
americas/state-dept-dissent-cable-trump-immigration-order.html.
34 See, e.g., Alex Hemmer, Note, Civil Servant Suits, 124 YALE L.J. 758, 776 (2014).
35 See Niraj Chokshi, “My Conscience Bothered Me”: Army Captain Sues Obama over “Illegal
War” on the Islamic State, WASH. POST (May 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/checkpoint/wp/2016/05/04/my-conscience-bothered-me-army-captain-sues-obama-
over-illegal-war-on-isis/?utm_term=.Ac9a4239c07f.
36 COMMON CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 25, at 11 tbl.5.
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raise families, and develop personal and professional ties in places geographi-
cally and culturally different from Washington—and from one another.  As
David Fontana has recently observed in his work on a “decentralized” federal
government, geographic dispersal is an essential component of limited gov-
ernment—as officials “in places distant and therefore different from Wash-
ington compete with and constrain one another.”37
Consider next the demographics.  According to recent data, women
total around 42% of the federal civilian workforce.38  And, as to race and
ethnicity, Caucasians constitute about 63% of all civilian, nonpostal federal
employees; African Americans 18%; Asian Americans 6%; and Latinos 5%.39
This makes the federal administrative workforce far more diverse, inclusive,
and reflective of American society than, say, Congress.  In 2017, Congress was
its most diverse in history, yet it was still 78% white—and only 20.5%
female.40  Importantly, the federal civil service’s 37% nonwhite population
practically mirrors the nation’s 38% nonwhite population.41
Consider too the partisan affiliations of civil servants.  Surveys indicate
that Republican and Republican-leaning bureaucrats represent approxi-
mately 40% of the federal, civilian workforce—not that far behind the 44%
who identify as or lean Democratic.42  The Democratic plurality is a bit larger
among the most senior civil servants43—and that surely matters in terms of
bureaucratic influence and agenda setting.  Still, the number of Democrats
37 David Fontana, Federal Decentralization, 104 VA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2018) (manu-
script at 3), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3029180.  It is not sur-
prising that Fontana’s work is gaining considerable attention right now, as politicians and
policymakers strive to find ways to make government more diverse, responsive, and repre-
sentative. See, e.g., Richard Florida, It’s Time to Move Some Federal Agencies out of D.C., CITY-
LAB (Nov. 30, 2017), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2017/11/its-time-to-move-some-
federal-agencies-out-of-dc/547172/; Evan Halper, Spread the Swamp? Trump Administration
Wants to Move Government Offices out of Washington, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), www.latimes.
com/politics/la-na-pol-spread-the-swamp-20171207-story.html+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl
=us.
38 COMMON CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 25, at 14 tbl.9.
39 Id. at 15 tbl.11; U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, LABOR FORCE CHARACTERISTICS BY
RACE AND ETHNICITY, 2015 (2016), https://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/race-and-ethnicity/
2015/pdf/home.pdf.
40 JENNIFER E. MANNING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44762, MEMBERSHIP OF THE 115TH
CONGRESS (2018).
41 See COMMON CHARACTERISTICS, supra note 25, at 15 tbl.11; Jens Manuel Krogstad,
114th Congress Is Most Diverse Ever, PEW RES. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2015), http://www.pewre
search.org/fact-tank/2015/01/12/114th-congress-is-most-diverse-ever/.
42 Chris Cornillie & Mark Lee, Government Executive 2016 Presidential Poll, GOV’T EXECU-
TIVE (Aug. 13, 2015), http://www.govexec.com/insights/government-executive-2016-presi
dential-poll-august-13-2015/119144/.  Somewhat different results have been reported by
David Lewis and Mark Richardson. See David E. Lewis, “Deep State” Claims and Professional
Government, REG. REV. (Dec. 5, 2017), https://www.theregreview.org/2017/12/05/lewis-
deep-state-professional-government/.
43 Eric Katz, There Are More Republicans in Federal Government than You Might Think,
GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Aug. 14, 2015), http://www.govexec.com/oversight/2015/08/there-
are-more-republicans-federal-government-you-might-think/119138/.
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and those leaning Democratic is below 50%.44  And, as further testament to
the political diversity of federal employees, only 43% of polled bureaucrats
approved of President Obama’s presidential tenure,45 a number that suggests
griping about the White House may have more to do with institutional
dynamics than with partisan affiliations.  If so, we may expect at least some
bureaucratic pushback against any and all incumbent Presidents regardless
of party affinities.
Of course, ideological diversity may not be distributed evenly across the
federal administrative expanse.  Personnel within any one agency may be
especially supportive of a particular political party’s beliefs, priorities, and
goals, whereas personnel in another agency may tend to identify with the
other party’s commitments.46  For instance, the Consumer Financial Protec-
tion Bureau or the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) may be heavily
staffed with Democrats,47 while the Department of Homeland Security and
the Department of Defense may each skew Republican.48  Such ideological
clustering may reflect nothing more than the fact that agency personnel truly
believe in, and are initially drawn to, their respective missions, with EPA offi-
cials championing strong environmental policies, and Pentagon employees
embracing hawkish stances.  The existence of these pockets of “true believ-
ers” shouldn’t be surprising, let alone suspect.  We’d never be unnerved, say,
by a judiciary that overwhelmingly believes in the rule of law and in the cen-
tral role that courts play in promoting it.  Indeed, we expect them to be “true
believers.”
And, lastly, consider the siloing of administrative responsibilities by sub-
ject matter, as exemplified by our having separate departments of education,
labor, transportation, and health and human services, not to mention sepa-
rate departments of defense, intelligence, homeland security, and justice.
The limited jurisdictional scope of each agency coupled with the inevitable
turf wars between each agency and its neighbors in adjacent regulatory
fiefdoms serve to cabin the influence wielded by any small set of administra-
tive officials.  Though there are prominent examples of multiagency collabo-
ration (and corresponding calls for more),49 the truth is that much of the
federal government’s work remains relatively compartmentalized.50
44 Id.
45 Cornillie & Lee, supra note 42.
46 See Lewis, supra note 42.
47 See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, The CFPB’s Employees Will Determine the Agency’s Fate, ATLANTIC
(Nov. 28, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/11/cfpb-mulvaney-
english/546899/; Lewis, supra note 42.
48 See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 42.
49 See, e.g., Eric Biber, Response, The More the Merrier: Multiple Agencies and the Future of
Administrative Law Scholarship, 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 78 (2012).
50 See Richard E. Levy & Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV.
499 (2011).
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Given such geographic, partisan, and subject-matter fragmentation, the
American deep state is (like Congress) best described as a they, not an it.51
And this is important because our fragmented deep state has few of the inter-
locking features that characterize powerful clans’ ready control over multiple
ministries and state enterprises, as we find in nations with conventionally
labeled deep states.  Indeed, our fragmentation makes any type of coordi-
nated, systematic attack on the political branches (or democracy itself) all
but impossible and, in any event, implausible.  Climate change experts are
singularly focused on, well, climate change.  Labor inspectors, in turn, zero
in on wage theft or unsafe working conditions.  And, cybersecurity officials
are, for their part, concentrating their attention on data breaches, malware,
and digital attacks.  None of these groups is likely particularly interested in
(or has any legal authority over) any of the others’ casus belli, let alone in
joining forces to categorically subvert Congress or the presidency.
What’s more, it should be noted that the internally variegated American
deep state—which becomes even more so if one chooses to lump in the likes
of Wall Street, Silicon Valley, the media, public-interest advocacy groups,
and/or the defense industry—reinforces rather than constricts the pluralism
that we hope for but don’t always get from the U.S. political branches.  With
elected leaders in America increasingly cut from the same cloth, studying at
the same schools, feeding at the same campaign finance troughs, and owing
allegiance to highly organized, concentrated, and polarized political parties
and movement groups, there may well be concern that Congress and the
President are insufficiently diverse, representative, and rivalrous (with one
another).  Thus, here too it is worth appreciating that the purportedly scary
deep state may on some levels be more in keeping with American political
pluralism than are the ostensible people’s representatives cloistered in high
elected office.
D. A Bulwark, Not a Battering Ram
When clashes arise with the political leadership, the relevant contingent
of civil servants typically assumes a defensive posture, challenging a problem-
atic initiative rather than hurtling forward with an initiative of its own.  The
defensive posture reflects their limited legal powers—civil servants, almost by
definition, are circumscribed in terms of the authority they wield and the
discretion they possess.52  The legal fact that there’s only so much that civil
servants can do is buttressed by the political reality that civil servants are well
51 See Kenneth A. Shepsle, Commentary, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative
Intent as Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992).
52 Were these employees to possess markedly more power, they’d likely be considered
officers of the United States—and therefore hired and fired pursuant to Article II of the
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 662 (1997) (emphasiz-
ing that the distinction between federal officers of the United States and employees of the
federal government turns on whether a job description calls for “[t]he exercise of ‘signifi-
cant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States’” (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 126 (1976) (per curiam))).
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aware of the dangers associated with overreaching.  As unelected “manda-
rins,” they are—or at least very much ought to be—cognizant of their own,
even more acute version of the federal judiciary’s “countermajoritarian diffi-
culty,” and thus must proceed cautiously and transparently.  That is to say,
they are—or, again, very much ought to be—well aware of the distrust and
skepticism surrounding American bureaucracy (which surely antedates and
transcends the Trump insurgency53) and thus take pains to intervene care-
fully, modestly, and sparingly.
While one ought not make too much out of any act/inaction distinction,
it is safe to say that foot dragging, report writing, leaking, and overall obsti-
nacy all tend to be less dangerous, presumptuous, and liberty threatening
than would be efforts to accelerate the workings of the State.54
E. Not an Extraconstitutional Force
The defensive posture of American bureaucracy matters for two reasons.
First, recognition that bureaucratic resistance is principally defensive in
nature should serve to tamp down fears of a deep state putsch.  Second, and
of far greater importance to those who aren’t actually fearful of a deep state
takeover but are nevertheless discomforted by the notion of mandarin insub-
ordination, bureaucratic resistance is entirely in keeping with one of our
principal constitutional defaults—namely, the separating and checking of
state power.  Our constitutional order is one of multidimensional separations
of power, not just the singular tripartite division among Congress, the Presi-
dent, and the judiciary.  The American Republic obtains its constitutional
structure and, by some lights, its legitimacy from pervasive and, again, mul-
tidimensional conflict—conflict between the sometimes, but not always,
rivalrous political branches, the feds and the several states, and the public
and private sectors.55  Since the New Deal, when Congress began delegating
heaps of its own lawmaking power to a rapidly growing administrative state
captained by the President, the instantiation of a strong, politically indepen-
dent bureaucracy constituted a suddenly necessary internal counterweight to
that otherwise unfettered, even imperial, President.56
This strong, independent bureaucracy—again protected by duly enacted
civil service laws and rendered credible and formidable by virtue of its rea-
53 See MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 8; Jon D. Michaels, Running Government Like a Busi-
ness . . . Then and Now, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1152 (2015) (reviewing NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO,
AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLUTION IN AMERICA, 1780–1940 (2013)).
54 Cf. Kalhan, supra note 3, at 16–24 (describing self-aggrandizing initiatives muscled
into law by Pakistan’s military).
55 See, e.g., Jon D. Michaels, Separation of Powers and Centripetal Forces: Implications for the
Institutional Design and Constitutionality of Our National-Security State, 83 U. CHI. L. REV. 199
(2016).
56 See Michaels, supra note 14; see also Neal Kumar Katyal, Essay, Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006); Gil-
lian E. Metzger, Essay, The Interdependent Relationship Between Internal and External Separation
of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423 (2009).
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soned, pragmatic, and impartial service to the State—redeemed and
enlarged the Framers’ commitment to checks and balances even as Congress
faded into the background, as it has in many policy domains.57  With so
much power already transferred from legislators (and judges) to agencies, it
is the bureaucracy—not Congress (or even the courts)—that often serves as
the last, if not best, check on presidential or agency-head overreach.58  And it
is to this bureaucracy that those aggrieved by imperious presidential and cab-
inet-level directives increasingly turn.
For this reason, if no other, deep state resistance to the President should
be seen as an evolutionary and ameliorative feature, not a bug, in our mod-
ern constitutional system that has drifted far from its original blueprint.
Robust, even feisty, bureaucracy, however unsettling that concept may be to
those who insist on thinking of the American Republic in its pre–New Deal
bloom, should therefore elicit support rather than distrust.
* * *
Of course, any such endorsement of a bureaucratic counterweight
hinges on the American deep state remaining true to form—that is, transpar-
ent, accessible, fragmented, and democratically pluralistic.  Though we can-
not take those defining characteristics of the American administrative state
for granted—especially when confronted with evidence of the bureaucracy’s
warts, shortcomings, and vulnerabilities—we can take some solace in the fact
that each of those signature attributes of the federal bureaucracy is a logical
outgrowth of our laws, conventions, and cultural and political commitments.
Specifically, transparency rules and laws providing for full and open public
participation, a merit-based (yet still solidly middle class) bureaucracy, and a
fragmented (ideologically diverse, programmatically siloed, and geographi-
cally dispersed) infrastructure all reflect considered public policy choices—
and, not coincidentally, guard against elite domination.  Surely, unprincipled
or immoderate pushback may occur from time to time, but nowhere to the
extent we are apt to see in fledgling democracies lacking much by way of a
thick, vibrant civil society, an ethos of public service, and a law-drenched
administrative state.  (Note that civil society—a key contributor to administra-
tive governance—constitutes an independent rival to the bureaucrats as well
as to the President and her agency heads, and thus nonprofit groups, journal-
57 See MICHAELS, supra note 13.  Disputes over the scope of agency authority are often
complicated by years and years of congressional silence on some of the most pressing issues
of the day. See, e.g., Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (determining, in part,
whether the Clean Air Act’s dated definition of pollution covers greenhouse gas emis-
sions); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 125–26 (2000) (deciding
whether the FDA’s enabling act can be read to cover tobacco and tobacco products).
58 For discussion of the courts adopting a deferential role when it comes to administra-
tive governance, see, for example, ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION (2016).  For dis-
cussion of a refashioned administrative separation of powers, which stands in for the
original three-branch scheme, see Jon D. Michaels, Of Constitutional Custodians and Regula-
tory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 227 (2016).
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ists, captains of industry, and random gadflies serve to keep both of those
administrative rivals in check.)59  What’s more, American bureaucracy is, in
important respects, seemingly more resistant to systematic domination by
special interests than is Congress, where the realities of permissive campaign
finance laws, liberal lobbying rules, a revolving door culture, and generally
tight party discipline conspire to enable readier capture.
III. A KINDER, GENTLER DEEP STATE
Given how different, diverse, and salutary the American deep state is
compared to many of its more insidious overseas counterparts, perhaps there
is wisdom in emphatically rejecting the moniker.  Maybe, that is to say, the
commonly understood connotations are too unfavorable and too entrenched
for the term to be applied usefully and benignly in the United States.
Yet why not wrest control of the descriptively powerful concept from the
bad guys pulling the strings in Ankara, Islamabad, and Cairo?  Turkey, Paki-
stan, and the like lack our bureaucratic depth.  And it is precisely the superfi-
ciality of those nations’ civic infrastructure that enables small coteries of
elites to subvert democratic initiatives (while relatively weak contingents of
bureaucrats and civil society groups look on helplessly).  Besides, referring to
a deep state adds color, meaning, and force above and beyond the rather
bland—and, in fairness, already pejorative—appellation “bureaucracy.”  This
is because a deep state implies not simply the administrative architecture
(which bureaucracy surely captures) but also a dynamic relationship between
generally long-serving, independent, impartial, and expert agency personnel
and partisan, political agency heads who typically serve short stints in govern-
ment.  Indeed, bureaucratic depth is a nice counterpoint to political shallow-
ness, insofar as agency heads average less than two years on the job—and
their political deputies cycle through with similar rapidity.60
I stress shallowness not in service of snark.  To the contrary, shallowness
plays a meaningful role in our system too.  Shallowness suggests an agency
leadership that is new and fresh, unburdened by ideas and practices that con-
gealed decades, if not generations, ago.  These short-term presidential
appointees purposely and, I think, virtuously, ride the wave of the present
political moment, only to be replaced in quick order by those catching the
next big wave.
Without understanding this dynamic relationship—the yin and yang of
the independent, career bureaucrats and the political high officeholders—
and the important work the bureaucracy does in checking an otherwise often
unfettered President, it is hard to fully grasp the utility, let alone the constitu-
59 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT (2012) (describing the presiden-
tial synopticon, in which the public at large is constantly scrutinizing—and thereby check-
ing—the President); MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 60–61.
60 For discussions of the short tenure of most presidential appointees, see David
Fontana, Government in Opposition, 119 YALE L.J. 548, 613–14 (2009); Anne Joseph
O’Connell, Vacant Offices: Delays in Staffing Top Agency Positions, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 913,
919–20 (2009).
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tionality, of our administrative state.  Indeed, failing to understand this
dynamic may help explain the manifold legal and political challenges to the
American administrative state.61  These challenges date back to the earliest
days of the New Deal and carry into the present, as evidenced by recent opin-
ions by our newest Supreme Court Justice (urging us to “face the [bureau-
cratic] behemoth”)62 and by promises by the Trump White House to
“deconstruct[ ] . . . the administrative state.”63
IV. A DEEPER DEEP STATE
Casting the American bureaucracy as a shadowy, unrepresentative super-
structure serves to discredit the administrative state and, no doubt, cow its
personnel into meek compliance, lest the civil service be further demonized.
It is, for instance, a revealing sign of the times that federal civil servants feel
compelled to reaffirm their oath of loyalty to the United States,64 as if their
original avowal and years of heretofore unquestioned service were suddenly
insufficient.65  It is also a revealing sign of the times when a cabinet secretary
declares, without a hint of substantiation (or fear of backlash), that a third of
his department’s employees are disloyal;66 when the President blithely
maligns FBI agents;67 and when a member of Congress (and former U.S.
Ambassador) calls for a purge of the Justice Department.68
This is precisely what any weak and insecure President wants: for if such
a President cannot discredit the bureaucracy, career personnel will remain at
the ready to contest, resist, and oppose unprincipled or unlawful White
House directives.  By contrast, a confident and capable President recognizes
61 See, e.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1240 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment); PHILIP HAMBURGER, IS ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
UNLAWFUL? (2015); see also Gillian E. Metzger, The Supreme Court, 2016 Term—Foreword:
1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2017).
62 Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J.,
concurring).
63 Philip Rucker & Robert Costa, Bannon Vows a Daily Fight for “Deconstruction of the
Administrative State,” WASH. POST (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/polit-
ics/top-wh-strategist-vows-a-daily-fight-for-deconstruction-of-the-administrative-state/2017/
02/23/03f6b8da-f9ea-11e6-bf01-d47f8cf9b643_story.html?utm_term=.5b023d3d7840
(quoting then–White House Chief Strategist Steve Bannon).
64 Jennifer Rubin, The Hollowing out of the Federal Workforce, WASH. POST (Sept. 7, 2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/wp/2017/09/07/the-hollowing-out-
of-the-federal-workforce/?utm_term=.7f751675f129.
65 See Jon D. Michaels, Uphold the Oath, TAKE CARE BLOG (Sept. 7, 2017), https://take-
careblog.com/blog/uphold-the-oath.
66 Darryl Fears & Juliet Eilperin, Zinke Says a Third of Interior’s Staff Is Disloyal to Trump
and Promises “Huge” Changes, WASH. POST (Sept. 26, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/energy-environment/wp/2017/09/26/zinke-says-a-third-of-interiors-staff-is-dis-
loyal-to-trump-and-promises-huge-changes/?utm_term=.6ff8f8c6a80b.
67 See Adam Serwer, Trump Escalates His Attacks Against FBI Officials, ATLANTIC (Dec. 23,
2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/12/trump-escalates-his-attacks-
against-fbi-officials/549164/.
68 Glorioso, supra note 1.
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the political and logistical benefits of preserving a vibrant, independent
bureaucracy that both lends credence to her (or any other President’s) rea-
sonable and lawful agenda, and signals policy coherence and political stabil-
ity to domestic and international audiences fearful of avulsive regulatory,
diplomatic, or military change.  Indeed, this recognition that Presidents may
benefit from a strong civil service substantially maps onto the constitutional
stage where we see prudent Presidents work with, not around, Congress.69
In any event, the very fact that bureaucratic scapegoating can so easily
pervade contemporary political discourse underscores the present weakness
of our deep state.  For decades—well before the Trump administration
announced its intention to “drain the swamp”70—the American bureaucracy
has been under siege.  Privatizing,71 political layering atop agencies,72 and
converting civil servants into at-will employees73—often in the name of “run-
ning government like a business”—have damaged the administrative archi-
tecture, demoralized agency personnel, and limited the bureaucracy’s
capacity to be meaningfully rivalrous.74
In recognizing the full value of a vibrant, forceful bureaucracy, particu-
larly in times of presidential instability and congressional dysfunction, per-
haps the moment is ripe not simply to own the deep state terminology but
also to fortify the clearly vulnerable and insufficiently deep deep state itself.
Among other things, we should:
A. Insource Privatized Responsibilities
Republican and Democratic Presidents alike have been aggressive in out-
sourcing critical government services, replacing tenured civil servants with
private contractors.75  Contractors now play central roles in environmental,
labor, and consumer protection policy design and enforcement; defense and
intelligence planning and operations; welfare administration; and public
safety and correctional work.76  Proponents of outsourcing seek to tap into
the efficiencies of competitive markets, where (so the story goes) firm
employees, unlike career bureaucrats, are motivated by the lures of profits
and the threat of ouster.77
69 See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY (2007) (arguing that presidential
unilateralism ultimately weakens executive power); see also Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (explaining that the Presi-
dent’s “authority is at its maximum” when he acts with the support of Congress).
70 Michaels, supra note 7 (internal quotation marks omitted).
71 See, e.g., Michaels, supra note 10, at 717, 719.
72 See PAUL C. LIGHT, THICKENING GOVERNMENT 7–13 (1995).
73 See Jon D. Michaels, Privatization’s Progeny, 101 GEO. L.J. 1023, 1026 (2013); see also
VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 47–51.
74 MICHAELS, supra note 13, at 165.
75 See Michaels, supra note 73, at 1058.
76 See Michaels, supra note 14, at 578.
77 See KEVIN R. KOSAR, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33777, PRIVATIZATION AND THE FED-
ERAL GOVERNMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 10–11 (2006); see also JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVA-
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Leaving aside the fact that contracting out rarely produces the promised
economic windfall (and leaving aside the allegations of fraud and abuse that
trail many a contractor),78 this pivot to the private sector weakens the inter-
nal, administrative separation of powers.  Whereas tenured civil servants are
legally and culturally positioned to challenge the President and her
appointed agency heads, contractors lack the requisite legal protections and
incentives.79  They are, after all, eager to have their contracts renewed and
even extended, and thus are inclined to be especially solicitous of the Presi-
dent’s agenda, irrespective of its prudence or fidelity to congressional man-
dates.80  Indeed, while many decry privatization as representing an
abdication of government authority,81 the bigger problem may well be the
converse one: the engendering of an entirely subservient contractor class
that, unlike the civil service, cannot provide the checking and balancing we
have come to expect and demand in our constitutional republic.82
B. Safeguard the Civil Service
Unfortunately, simply insourcing jobs would be an insufficient step, at
least given the complementary decades-long campaign to strip nonprivatized
government personnel of their civil service protections.83  This campaign to
marketize the bureaucracy, effectively converting government workers into a
de facto private labor force,84 has already succeeded under Presidents
George W. Bush and Barack Obama in reclassifying vast swaths of agency
personnel as at-will employees.85  These newly marketized government work-
ers are subject to summary termination for any reason, including political
disagreement.
If President Trump is able to follow through on his repeated promises,
voiced most recently in his 2018 State of the Union Address,86 much of the
remaining civil service will likewise be converted.  And even absent the for-
mal, legal reclassification of federal employees, Trump has managed to force
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TORS 34–35 (2011), http://pogoarchives.org/m/co/igf/bad-business-report-only-2011
.pdf.
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81 See KOSAR, supra note 77, at 10.
82 See Michaels, supra note 14, at 590.
83 Michaels, supra note 73, at 1041.
84 See id.
85 See KOSAR, supra note 77, at 1; VERKUIL, supra note 13, at 47–51.
86 President Donald J. Trump, State of the Union Address (Jan. 30, 2018), https://
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out hundreds of senior civil servants.87  He has done so by marginalizing
their work, conducting seemingly politically motivated audits and “opposi-
tion research” campaigns, and reassigning bureaucratic leaders to positions
well outside of their zones of expertise.88
As with contracting out, there is an ostensible technocratic motivation
for marketizing the bureaucracy.  Some see government job protection—ten-
ure—as inviting indolence and lethargy.89  Presidents—and particularly one
who popularized the phrase “You’re fired!” on The Apprentice—may thus be
excused for preferring highly responsive workers.
But that doesn’t mean we should give them what they want.  Any poten-
tial efficiency gain must be weighed against the near-certain loss of bureau-
cratic independence.  At-will employees will be chilled from challenging a
presidential administration on questions of policy or politics.  Thus, once
again, without a capable and confident bureaucracy, we sacrifice the last and
perhaps most reliable line of defense against an overreaching President.
Note too that getting rid of the least productive workers—if that is
indeed all that marketization aims to do—will hardly defang the deep state.
It isn’t the stereotypical lazy bureaucrats—think DMV workers Patty and
Selma from The Simpsons—who threaten the White House.  Rather, it is the
most competent, talented, and hard-charging ones that pose the threat, and
the only justification for firing those folks is an unabashedly political one.
Support for the deep state thus requires an unflinching commitment to
a strong and independent bureaucracy, ensuring our government personnel
and the public authorized to participate in regulatory affairs have the legal
and institutional platform to speak truth to power.  It is this deep state that
helped usher us through the Great Depression, World War II, the Cold War,
Watergate, and the more recent travails of 9/11 and the Great Recession.
Now, in this moment of great political, economic, and geostrategic upheaval,
we will need to rely on the steadying hand of this deep state more than ever.
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